“Antitrust Cases and the Commitment Decision in the Energy Sector”, ROEC, Petroleum Industry Review Magazine, October 2011 (bilingual edition) more

Politica europeana Tn domeniul concurentei Cazurile antitrust §i angajamentele in sectoral energetic Subiectul acestui articol este o norma procedural^ prevazutaTn Regulamentul (CE) 1/2003 §' care este frecvent utilizata atat de catre Comisia Europeana, cat sj de catre Tntreprinderi Tn rezolvarea cazurilor antitrust Tn special pe piata gazelor naturale dupa ancheta sectorials din anul 2007. Mai exact, materialul se refera la articolul 9 - „Angajamente" Tn cazurile antitrust. Textul discuta starea de fapt actuala, analizeaza motivele care au dus la introducerea „dec/z/e/ de angajament", dar sj principalele avantaje sj dezavantaje ale noii proceduri. Tn plus, textul ofera o scurta privire de ansamblu asupra anchetei din 2007 sj a problemelor pe care le-a evidential Cazurile GDF sj E.ON ilustreaza un tip aparte de Tncalcare a concurentei (rezervarea pe termen lung a capacitatii infrastructurii de transport), prin care intrarea pe piata sj competitia pot fi restrictionate Tn avantajul companiilor dominante. de Valentina-Andreea Dimulescu, Romania Energy Center (ROEC) Angajamentele - origini $iprocedura In mai 2004, Comisia Europeana (CE) a retras asa-numita „procedura de achitare" prin care intreprinderile puteau trimite sesizari cu privire la un acord semnat intre companii. Rolul sau era de a permite obtinerea de catre companii a asa-numitei „achitari negative" de incalcarea art. 101 (l) din Tratatul privind Functionarea Uniunii Europene (TFUE) sau o dispensa individuals (in temeiul art 101(3) TFUE) in ceea ce priveste regulile concurentei UE cu conditia ca efectele pro-concurentiale sa compenseze impactul negativ asupra pietei. Procedura achitarii reprezenta o importanta povara administrativa atat pentru companii, cat si pentru CE. Prin urmare, CE a decis ca art. 101(1), 102 si 101(3) TFUE urmau a putea fi aplicate si la nivel national prin intermediul unui sistem de exceptari; a fost introdus un sistem de auto-evaluare prin care sarcina probei ca intelegerea respecta conditiile pentru achitare a fost transferata catre companiile implicate. Noua procedura - decizia de angajament - este folosita in special pentru cazuri ce implica abuzuri de pozitie dominanta, scopul ei fiind corectarea viitorului comportament al intreprinderii. Obiectivul este de a permite intreprinderilor aflate sub suspiciunea comiterii unui abuz de a opta intre riscul de a fi nevoita sa plateasca o amenda si posibilitatea de incheia un angajament cu CE, promitandu-i acesteia restabilirea concurentei pe piata in cauza. In acest sens, dupa ce primeste evaluarea preliminara a CE in care aceasta isi prezinta preocuparile initiale cu privire la situatia concurentei, compania poate veni cu o propunere pentru un angajament prin care pro mite stoparea abuzului suspectat si negociaza modul prin care concurenta poate fi restabilita. De la aparitia acestei proceduri, numarul angajamentelor a crescut: in 2005 au existat doua (DFB, Coca- Cola), in 2006 patru (Asociatia de Fotbal Premier League, REPSOL C.P.P SA, Alrosa/DBCAG/City si West East, Acordul de la Cannes), in 2007 cinci (Distrigaz, Daimler Chrysler, Toyota, General Motors, Fiat), in 2008 doua (pe piata angro de energie electrica si pe piata de echilibrare de energie electrica - ambele implicau compania E.ON in Germania), in 2009 cinci (Rambus, GDF, RWE, LACS - Clasificarea Navelor, Microsoft) si in 2010 sase (ENI, E.ON Gaz, Svenska 50 www.petroleumreview.ro Kraftnat, FED, Visa Europe CIM, British Airways/American Airlines/ Iberia). Pentru a intelege de ce angaj amentul a devenit atat de popular, trebuie retinut faptul ca acest instrument are atat avantaje, cat si dezavantaje. El acorda Comisiei „promptitudine si economieprocedurala", adica o rezolvare mai rapida a cazului si economisirea resurselor. In plus, permite un deznodamant mai precis decat deciziile de infringement care cad sub incidenta art. 7 din Regulament (utilizate in „cazurih antitrust foarte sa subliniem ca odata ce angajamentul este acceptat, CE „poate concluziona ca nu mai exista motive pentru actiune", i.e. ancheta este oprita, nu va exista nicio speta, nicio recunoastere sau respingere publica a acuzatiilor sj nicio decizie privind incalcarea dreptului comunitar. Cu alte cuvinte, procedura prin care se cere incetarea abuzului va fi suspendata, iar intreprinderea, fara a recunoaste sau a nega orice ilegalitate, se angajeaza in mod legal sa-si corecteze comportamentul. De asemenea, tertii, fie ei companii sau clienti, sunt dezavantajati deoarece grave"), prin care se cere incetarea incalcarii dreptului comunitar, acestea din urma fiind mai greu de pus in aplicare. De asemenea, un recurs din partea companiilor este putin probabil, deoarece controlul juridic in ceea ce priveste evaluarea preliminara a Comisiei este limitat numai la „inexactitati vadite". Companiile prefera aceasta metoda, deoarece nu sunt acuzate de vreo incalcare a dreptului comunitar si, pe cale de consecinta, nu sunt amendate, economisind timp si bani. In plus, instantele nationale nu pot acorda daune-interese victimelor incalcarii - in contrast cu remediile posibile prin art. 7. Pe de alta parte, este important acestia nu pot depune o plangere prin care sa ceara daune. Cu toate acestea, CE are putere discretionara in a accepta/respinge si in a evalua angajamentul, mai ales dupa decizia CEJ in cazul Alrosa, in urma careia domeniul de aplicare al autoritatii Comisiei s-a extins. In cazul in care Comisia accepts angaj amentele, ea adopta o decizie prin care, pentru o perioada determinata, acestea devin obligatorii din punct de vedere juridic. Inainte de adoptarea acestei decizii, angajamentul propus de catre intreprindere trebuie sa faca obiectul unui test de piata pentru a evalua daca acesta va avea efectul dorit de restabilire a concurentei. In termen de o luna de la publicarea unui anunt public oficial, CE invita partile terte interesate sa isi prezinte observatiile cu privire la angajamentele depuse, iar intreprinderile implicate vor avea dreptul de acces la produsul final, i.e. sumarul cauzei publicat de catre Comisie. Dupa analizarea acestor observatii, CE poate solicita ca orice parte a angaj amentelor sa fie schimbata sau le poate respinge in totalitate si poate reincepe investigarea unei posibile incalcari. Dupa cum era de asteptat, exista un proces de monitorizare prin care intreprinderea este obligata sa trimita la fiecare sase luni un raport cu privire la respectarea angaj amentului. Cu toate acestea, CE are posibilitatea „la cereresau din oficiu" de a reporni procedura de acuzare daca a existat o incalcare a angaj amentului din partea intreprinderii. Daca vreunul dintre motivele regasite in art. 9(2) al Regulamentului se manifests fie inmod intentionat sau din neglijenta, CE poate aplica partilor implicate amenzi de pana la 10% din cifra de afaceri anuala. In plus, CE poate impune penalitati cu titlu cominatoriu care nu depasesc 5% din cifra de afaceri zilnica medie din exercitiul financiar precedent pentru fiecare zi de intarziere, in cazul in care intreprinderile nu respecta angajamentul devenit obligatoriu. Ancheta sectorials din 2007 $i consecintele legale Ca urmare a plangerilor provenite din partea unor companii tinere §i a consumatorilor, ancheta din anul 2007 cu privire la sectoarele de energie electrica §i gaze a avut drept scop identificarea posibilelor incalcari ale dreptului concurentei §i limitari ale procesului de liberalizare (Comunicarea Comisiei Europene, COM(2006) 851 final). Raportul final a relevat opt deficiente substantiale (din care le-am selectat pe cele relevante pentru sectorul gazelor naturale): 1. concentrarea pietei, in spe- 51 cial in ceea ce priveste domeniul comertului en gros, deoarece marile companii (furnizorii traditionali) au ramas dominante prin controlarea importurilor de gaz in upstream §i/sau a productiei interne de gaz; prin urmare, intrarea pe piata a nou- venitilor a fost foarte limitata, iar acestia din urmS erau dependenti de intreprinderile integrate pe verticals de-a lungul lantului de aprovizionare; 2. blocarea verticals §i amenin- tarea la adresa sigurantei aprovizio- narii generate de separarea necores- punz&toare intre administrarea retelei §i a operatiunilor de alimentare, fapt ce a blocat accesul noilor firme la retele in contextul existentei unei discriminari in favoarea afiliatilor companiei dominante; in plus, contractele pe termen lung intre producatorii de gaz §i marii importatori traditionali a ingreunat accesul pe pietele upstream; 3. integrarea slaba a pietei intrucat furnizorii traditionali rareori au patruns pe alte piete nationale in calitate de concurenti din cauza capacitatii transfrontaliere insuficiente (nou venitii nu pot sS-§i asigure tranzitul §i o capacitate de intrare stabila pe noile piete §i din cauza faptului ca furnizorii traditionali nu §i-au extins capacitatea §i pentru firmele noi, ci pentru propriile nevoi de aprovizionare) §i a structurilor de piata diferite; 4. transparenta slaba a pietei im- piedica activitatea noilor intrati din cauza unei asimetrii a informatiei intre acesti noi veniti §i companiile deja existente; 5. o formare ineficienta si netransparenta a preturilor in con- tractele de import pe termen lung care a lezat consumatorul §i a reprezentat o bariera la intrarea pe piata; 6. concurenta limitata si o con- centrate ridicata la nivelul vanzarii cu amanuntul (piata downstream) cauzate de durata lunga a contractelor intre clientii industriali §i societatile locale de distribute, contracte restric- tive de furnizare ce provin de la firmele dominante §i lipsa ofertelor com- petitive de aprovizionare din partea unor noi societati comerciale; 7. pietele de echilibrare in sectorul gazelor sunt prea mici, mentinand astfel puterea pe piata a furnizorilor traditionali §i marind costurile trans- portului de gaz pentru noile firme; 8. pietele de LNG sunt dominate de catre furnizorii traditionali national^ impiedicand astfel concurenta pe pietele downstream. Cele mai recente cazuri (GDF §i E.ON Gaz), in care decizia de angaj anient a fost adoptata in iunie 2009 §i respectiv in mai 2010, se refera la o modalitate specifics de incalcare a art. 102 TFUE prin a§a-numita rezervare pe termen lung a capacitatii infrastructurii de transport. Furnizorul traditional integrat pe verticals a rezervat pe termen lung capacitatea retelei de gaze propriilor companii de aprovizionare („operatorii de sisteme de transport"). Rezultatul a fost cS pSrtile terte nu puteau obtine acces la retea - care era un monopol natural - prin intermediul principalelor puncte de intrare pentru a-§i servi clientii. Prin urmare, din cauza acestei blocSri a pietei, pozitia dominants a furnizorului traditional a fost garantatS, iar consumatorii nu aveau posibilitatea de a alege intre furnizorii de gaze. In cadrul investigatiei sale, CE s-a axat mai mult asupra deficientelor in transportul gazelor decat pe prejudiciile su- ferite de cStre consumatori §i a constatat cS retelele detinute de cStre companiile dominante pot fi vSzute drept „imtalatii esentiale", adicS o infrastructurS ce trebuie sS fie impSrtitS intre diferite entitSti, scopul fiind acela de a asigura concurenta pe o anumitS piatS upstream. Refuzul de a acorda acces poate fi considerat drept un abuz de pozitie dominants prin negarea accesului companiilor de gaze concurente care nu detin resurse pentru a crea o altS retea §i care, prin urmare, nu au nici o altS retea de transport disponibilS. MSsurile corective avute in vedere au fost, in mod evident, diminuarea posibilitStii de a rezerva capacitatea retelelor pe pietele de gaze din Franta §i Germania in douS etape: l) ambele companii trebuie sS elibereze 10-15% din capacitatea totals in punctele de intrare esentiale §i 2) panS in 2014 (GDF) §i panS in 2015 (E.ON), companiile trebuie s5-§i reducS cota parte din retea panS la 50% §i sS nu dep5§easc5 aceste angajamente pentru inca 10 ani. Comisia a promis ca va insista in actiunea sa de aplicare a legislatiei in sectorul energetic acordand o atentie specials tendintei „refuzului de a furniza", intrucat „accesul la infrastructura energetica ramane un obstacol major in calea concurentei in sectorul energetic european" (Cardoso, Kijewski, Koch, Lindberg, Nagy, „Deciziile Comisiei in cazurile GDF si E.ON Gaz cu privire la rezervarea pe termen lung a capacitatii", Buletin Informativ in Politica Concurentei, Antitrust, nr.3,2010). Concluzie: mentinerea t autoritatii prin reducerea certitudinii juridice Este important de retinut cS procedura antitrust presupune o abordare ex post, fiind o incercare de a gestiona un comportament anticompetitiv de pe piatS. Inainte de introducerea angajamentelor, companiilor li se acorda un grad de securitate juridicS prin faptul cS o intelegere era scutitS prin intermediul procedurii de achitare. Din 2004, CE a redus semnificativ aceastS posibilitate, de§i, impreunS cu autoritStile nationale de concurentS, ea poate oferi indrumare informalS. Acest lucru a lSsat piata intr-o stare de nesigurantS de vreme ce CE poate interveni ex post in orice moment. In concluzie, Regulamentul 1/2003 a permis descentralizarea sistemului, dar nu a diminuat autoritatea Comisiei in a aplica normele comunitare de concurentS asupra pietei unice europene. 4 52 www.petroleumreview.ro business class | European Competition Policy Antitrust Cases and the Commitment Decision in the Energy Sector The present article deals with a specific rule set out in Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003, frequently used by both the European Commission (EC) and undertakings in handling antitrust cases, especially in the gas market after the 2007 sector inquiry. More precisely, it refers to Article 9 - Commitments in antitrust cases. It discusses the current state of affairs, examines the reasons that lead to the introduction of the commitment decision, as well as its main advantages and disadvantages. The GDF and E.ON case studies it introduces illustrate a particular type of breach (long-term transportation infrastructure capacity booking) whereby market entrance and competition can be hampered to the advantage of incumbent firms. by Valentina-Andreea Dimulescu, Romania Energy Center (ROEC) The commitment decision - origins and procedure In May 2004, the European Commission (EC) withdrew the so- called "clearance procedure" of notifying agreement between companies. Its role was to have companies obtain either a "negative clearance" of non- infringement of Article 101 (1) Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), or an individual dispensation (under Article 101(3) TFEU) from EU's competition rules, provided the pro-competitive effects outweighed the negative market impact. The clearance procedure was a major bureaucratic burden both to the companies and the EC itself Consequently, the EC decided that Articles 10l(l), 102 and 101(3) TFEU would be applied at national level via an exception system; a self- assessment system was introduced in which the burden of proof for exemption was transferred to the companies involved. The new procedure introduced in its stead - the commitment decision - is used especially for cases of abuse of a dominant position, aiming at correcting the company's future behaviour. Its purpose is to allow the undertakings under suspicion of an abuse to opt between the risk of paying a fine and the possibility to offer a pledge to the EC that competition will be restored on the market in question. Thus, after a preliminary assessment in which the EC presents its initial competition concerns, the company can table a proposal for a commitment, promising to stop the suspected infringement and negotiating the ways to restore competition. Since its introduction, the number of commitment decisions has increased: in 2005 there were two (DFB, Coca-Cola), in 2006 four (Premier League Football Association, REPSOL C.P.P SA, ALROSA/ DBCAG/City and West East, Cannes Agreement), in 2007 five (Distrigaz, Daimler Chrysler, Toyota, General Motors, Fiat), in 2008 two (on the German electricity wholesale market and the electricity balancing market - both involving EON), in 2009 five (Rambus, GDF, RWE, IACS Ship Classification, Microsoft) and in 2010 six (ENI, E.ON Gas, Svenska Kraftnat, EDF, Visa Europe MIF, British Airways/American Airlines/Iberia). In order to understand why the commitment decision has become so popular, we should note that it has both advantages and disadvantages. For the EC, it offers "expediency and procedural economy", i.e. faster conclusions and use of less resources. It also permits more targeted outcomes than infringement decisions falling underArticle 7 of the 68 www.petroleumreview.ro Regulation (used in "hardcore antitrust Nevertheless, the EC has dis- eases"), which are more cumbersome cretionary power in accepting/re- to implement. In addition, an appeal jeering and assessing the commitment, from the companies is unlikely since especially after the ECJ's decision in the judicial review for the EC's preliminary Alrosa case, which expanded the scope assessment is limited only to "manifest ofthe EC's authority Ifthe Commission incorrectness". accepts the commitments, it adopts The companies prefer this new a decision making them legally method since through it they are not binding for a certain period of time, accused of infringement and fined, Prior to adopting this decision, the and it saves them time and money, commitment must be made subject to Also, private damage claims cannot be a market test in order to assess its effect forwarded to national courts by those on restoring competition. The test affected by an infringement - unlike demands that, within a month's time Article 7 remedies. On the other hand, after the publication of an official public it is important to stress that once the notice, the EC invite interested third commitment is accepted, the EC "shall parties to submit their remarks on the conclude that there are no longer grounds tabled commitments - the end product for action by the Commission", i.e. the of which the companies involved investigation is halted; there will be will have access to. After analyzing no case law, no public admission or these comments, the EC may request rejection of the accusations and no that any part of the commitments infringement decision. Thus, there be changed or rejected altogether, will be a standstill of all infringement and then go back to investigating proceedings against the company a possible infringement. As would which, without recognizing or denying be expected, there is a monitoring any wrongdoing, legally commits itself process whereby the undertaking is to correcting its behaviour. Also, third obliged to send every six months a parties, be they companies or clients, report documenting its commitment are at a disadvantage since they cannot observance. However, the EC can, push forward a damage claim. "upon request or on its own initiative," restart the proceedings if there has been a breach of the undertaking's own commitment. If any of the reasons found in Article 9(2) of the Regulation occur either intentionally or negligently, the EC can impose fines on the parties involved up to 10% of the annual turnover. Moreover, it may impose periodic penalty payments of up to 5% of the average daily turnover in the preceding business year per day if the undertakings do not comply with the commitment. The 2007 sector inquiry and the legal aftermath As a result of complaints coming from new firms and consumers, the 2007 electricity and gas sectors inquiry aimed at identifying possible breaches of competition law and limitations of the liberalization process (EC Communication, COM(2006) 851 final). The final report revealed eight substantial deficiencies (we selected the ones relevant for the gas sector): 1. market concentration, es- pecially on the wholesale level, since major companies remained dominant by commanding upstream gas imports and/or domestic gas production; therefore, market entrance was very limited with new entrants dependent on vertically integrated undertakings throughout the supply chain; 2. vertical foreclosure and threats to the security of supply generated by inadequate unbundling between network administration and the supply operations which blocked new entrants' access to networks in the context of discrimination in favour of the dominant company's affiliates; in addition, long term contracts between gas producers and large importers stifled access on the upstream markets; 3. low market integration since incumbents seldom entered other national markets as competitors because of insufficient cross-border capacities (new entrants cannot establish secure transit and entry business class capacity into newmarkets also because the incumbents did not expand their capacity for new firms, but for their own supply needs) and different market designs; 4. low market transparency hin- dering new entrants due to an infor- mation asymmetry between new- comers and existing companies; 5. ineffective and non- transparent price formation in long term import contracts which harmed the consumer and posed as a market entry barrier; E.ON Gas), where the commitment decision was passed in June 2009 and May 2010 respectively refer to a specific type of infringement of Article 102 TFEU through the so-called long- term transportation infrastructure capacity booking. The dominant vertically integrated company had reserved the gas network's capacity on a long-term basis to its own supply businesses ("transportsystem operators"). The result was that third parties could not gain access to the network - which was a natural monopoly - via 6. limited competition and high concentration at the retail level (downstream market) caused by long contract durations between industrial customers and incumbent suppliers, restrictive supply contract practices coming from incumbents and the lack of competitive supply offers from new companies; 7. balancing markets in the gas sector are too small thus maintaining the incumbents' market power and increasing the newcomers' gas transport costs; 8. LNG markets are dominated by national incumbents, thus hindering downstream competition. The most recent cases (GDF and the principal entry points in order to serve their customers. Therefore, because of this market foreclosure, the incumbent's dominance was secured and consumers did not have a choice between gas suppliers. In its investigation, the EC focused on the gas transportation deficiencies more than on consumer harm and found that the networks belonging to dominant firms can be seen as "essential facilities", that is an infrastructure which must be shared among different entities in order to ensure competition on a certain downstream market. The refusal to grant access can be considered as an abuse of a dominant position in denying access to competing gas companies which do not have the resources to create another grid and have therefore no other transportation network available. The remedies envisaged were obviously aimed at diminishing capacity bookings on the French and German gas markets in two steps: l) both companies are to liberate 10-15% of total capacity at the essential entry points and 2) until 2014 (GDF) and 2015 (EON) the companies are to reduce their network share to 50% and not surpass these commitments for another 10 years. The EC pledged that it will persist in its enforcement action in the energy sector giving particular attention to the "refusal to supply" tendency, as "access to energy infrastructure remains a major barrier to competition in European energy markets" (Cardoso, Kijewski, Koch, Lindberg, Nagy, "The Commission's GDF and E.ON Gas decisions concerning long-term capacity bookings", Competition Policy Newsletter, Anti- trust, No.3,2010). Conclusion: reducing legal certainty as a way of securing authority Importantly, the antitrust procedure is an ex post approach, as it attempts to deal with an anticompetitive market behaviour. Prior to the introduction of commitment decisions, companies were granted a degree of legal certainty via the clearance procedure that an agreement would be exempt. Starting with 2004 the EC significantly reduced this possibility, although together with the national competition authorities it can provide informal guidance. This left the market in a state of insecurity since the Commission can now intervene ex post at any moment. In conclusion, Regulation 1/2003 allowed the decentralization of enforcement, but it did not diminish the Commission's authority in implementing competition rules across the European single market, 1 70 www.petroleumreview.ro